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I. Introduction
The extent to which R&D investments affect stock
performance is determined by investor beliefs and ex-
pectations that are informed by factors such as the
R&D expenditure to market value of equity ratio, debt
ratio, planned R&D increases, and growth opportu-
nities (Szewczyk, Tsetsekos, and Zantout 1996; Zan-
tout 1997; Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis 2001).
This interdisciplinary study1 develops some insights
into this expectation formation by investigating how
three important characteristics salient to the investor,
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Nethercott, and an anonymous referee. The support provided by
the office of Financial Databases at the National University of Sin-
gapore is acknowledged. The editorial comments provided by Su-
Chen Wang and Jessie Teng are also appreciated. Contact the cor-
responding author, Yew Kee Ho, at bizhoyk@nus.edu.sg.
1. This interdisciplinary study includes studies in accounting,
corporate finance, economics, industrial organization, and strategic
management.
We show that a firm’s
ability to reap growth op-
portunities from R&D in-
vestments depends on its
size, leverage, and the in-
dustry concentration.
While the direct effects





small firms disappear as
their leverage increases.
Specifically, small firms
with high leverage reap




served when size and
leverage are considered
independently in existing
studies on value and
stock return relevance of
R&D investment. We
also highlight firm-spe-
cific factors that guide in-
vestors’ valuation of
R&D.
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namely, firm size, financial leverage, and industry concentration, affect the
degree and type of influence R&D investment exerts on the growth oppor-
tunities of firms. Schumpeter (1952) and Arrow (2000) find that greater access
to financing sources allows larger firms to be more innovative. Schumpeter
(1934) alludes to the fact that innovation cannot be funded by returns from
a firm’s normal operating cycle but must depend on credit, and Arrow (2000)
notes that the availability of the alternative funding sources depends on firm
size. In addition, Williamson (1988) notes that the optimal financing sources
are restricted since the intangible nature of assets created by R&D investments
calls for an appropriate governance structure to reduce transaction costs and
to control managerial opportunistic behavior. Thus firm size and financial
leverage are not two independent firm variables, but rather they interact to
determine the value of R&D investment. Furthermore, Schumpeter (1952)
highlights the important contextual role that industry structure plays in the
innovative endeavor when he observes that firms in monopolistic competition
produce more innovation as opposed to those in the perfectly competitive
market.
Our study differs from existing literature in several ways. First, we examine
the interaction effects of firm characteristics (firm size and financial leverage)
and an industry characteristic (industry concentration) on the impact that R&D
investment has on the growth opportunities of a firm. Existing literature, on
the other hand, has treated these firm and industry characteristics as inde-
pendent effects, thus failing to capture the interaction effects that naturally
arise from the arguments put forth by Schumpeter (1934), Williamson (1988),
and Arrow (2000). Second, while other studies of the impact of R&D on firm
value employ ex post measures such as returns or stock price, we choose to
examine the effectiveness of R&D investment through the use of an ex ante
measure, namely, a firm’s growth opportunities. Ex post measures of firm
value or performance can mask the real impact of R&D since they tend to
be affected by the firm’s endogenous characteristics and market forces in the
intervening period. The use of an ex ante measure in the form of growth
opportunities is appropriate since R&D investment is a form of intangible
investment that contributes to the long-term growth of the firm (Chan et al.
2001; Chambers, Jennings, and Thompson 2002). The measure of growth
opportunities is a better ex ante measurement of the market perception of the
value creation of R&D investment.
Our study makes three contributions. First, we provide evidence to show
the positive impact of R&D investment on the growth opportunities of a firm.
Second, we provide empirical evidence on the direction and intensity of the
collective interaction effects of firm size, financial leverage, and industry
concentration on the R&D investment–growth opportunity relationship. Third,
we articulate the possible theories that may explain the direction and intensity
of these collective interaction effects.
Our study strongly supports the conclusion that R&D investment has a
positive impact on firms’ growth opportunities, with this impact amplified by
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large size and diluted by high industry concentration. Furthermore, analysis
of the firm size, financial leverage, and industry concentration interactions
shows that the advantages of firm size are moderated by the levels of financial
leverage but not by industry concentration. That is, R&D investments are
positively associated with growth opportunities as firm size increases when
financial leverage is low but are negatively associated when financial leverage
is high; industry concentration appears not to be important.
The findings on the interaction effects are interesting for two reasons. First,
they contradict our preconceived economic notions that firm size and industry
concentration drive firm growth. We find strong evidence that the comparative
advantage of large firms over small firms in reaping growth opportunities
from R&D investment is conditional on the firm’s level of financial leverage.
This result may be explained by the insights from transaction cost analysis
that suggests that funding decision affects the governance of a firm. That this
effect on firm governance is dissimilar across large and small firms could
account for the inconclusive and even contradictory results on the appropri-
ability advantage of R&D investments in large firms observed in a number
of prior studies that fail to consider the size-leverage interaction (see, e.g.,
Kamien and Schwartz [1982] and Cohen and Klepper [1996] and contrast
with Acs and Audretsch [1988], among others). Second, the findings of this
study allow investors, management, creditors, and economic policy makers
to understand the reasons for the optimal combination of firm size, financial
leverage, and industry concentration, and investment in R&D that will max-
imize growth opportunities.
In Sections II and III, we review the literature, discuss the economic ra-
tionale that drives our study, outline the research methodology, and provide
a description of the sample and the computation of the R&D capital. Sections
IV and V present the analysis on the independent and two-way interaction
effects of firm size, financial leverage, and industry concentration on R&D
investment in generating growth opportunities, respectively, and Section VI
concludes the study.
II. Literature Review and Theory Development
The value of a firm is in essence measured by the present value of its future
cash flows. This is given by the generic valuation equation
 CFtV p (1)0 t(1  r)tp 1
where is the value of a firm at , is the cash flow at time t, andV t p 0 CF0 t
r is the appropriate discount rate. In this study, we use growth opportunities
as an ex ante measure of a firm’s ability to generate cash flow from its assets.
Contributions to firm value occur at three levels. Contributions at the first
level come from relatively easy to value tangible assets in place such as land,
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building, and equipment. At the next level of complexity, contributions come
from merger and acquisition activities. Though these may be more difficult
to value, the presence of similar firms and relative valuations facilitate the
valuation process. At another level, contribution can come from intangible
assets such as brand names and intellectual property developed through ad-
vertising and R&D, respectively.2 However, contributions from this level are
difficult to value since further investments may be necessary to exploit the
intellectual property and such investments are likely to create firm-specific
intangible assets of little value to outsiders (Balakrishnan and Fox 1993;
O’Brien 2003). In summary, growth opportunities are affected by investments
in tangible assets, mergers and acquisitions, and intangible assets.
Besides assets, Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996) and McGahan (1999a, 1999b)
conclude that the growth opportunities of a firm are also determined by its
endogenous firm characteristics of size and financial leverage, as well as
external industry structure factors such as the level of concentration. The
dependency of growth opportunities on a firm’s investments, its endogenous
characteristics, and industry structure can be summarized as follows:
GO p f [Investment(TA, M&A, ITA), SIZE, LEVERAGE, CONC],
(2)
where GO, the growth opportunities of a firm, is a function of the three types
of investments, the size of the firm (SIZE), its financial leverage (LEVER-
AGE), and the level of concentration in the industry in which it operates
(CONC). The three types of investments, tangible assets (TA), mergers and
acquisitions (M&A), and intangible assets (ITA), which include brand name,
advertising, and R&D, important though they are to growth opportunities,
will not be examined in full in this study. This study concentrates on the
impact of R&D on the growth opportunities of a firm, and hence, the following
section develops economic theories on how firm size, financial leverage, and
industry concentration affect the effectiveness of R&D in generating growth
opportunities.3 We then discuss how the interactions of firm size, financial
leverage, and industry concentration moderate the relationship between a
firm’s R&D investment and its growth opportunities.
A. Firm Size and R&D’s Impact on Growth Opportunities
A large body of literature in the field of industrial organization and economics
has been devoted to interpreting and testing two popular hypotheses ex-
2. Martin (2002) provides a summary of some of the valuation models that relate R&D in-
vestment to the valuation of a firm. Our study assumes this linkage and seeks to test the various
conditions in which R&D investment is most effective in increasing the value of a firm.
3. We are aware that investments in tangible assets, mergers and acquisitions, brand names,
and advertising are important determinants of the growth opportunities of a firm. A complete
model inclusive of these three determinants will be the subject of future study. This paper focuses
on a reduced form: the R&D effect on growth opportunities given two endogenous characteristics
of the firm and one characteristic of the industry in which it operates.
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pounded by Schumpeter (1952) on innovation. The two hypotheses are as
follows:
a. Large firms are disproportionately more innovative than small firms.
b. Large firms can exploit the results of innovation better than small firms.
These hypotheses raise two questions about the firm size–R&D investment
relationship. The first is whether economies of scale exist for R&D. The
evidence from previous studies that have examined the direct output from
R&D investment suggests that there are no economies of scale in R&D, but,
rather, the law of diminishing returns seems to hold (Acs and Audretsch 1988).
Acs, Audretsch, and Feldman (1994) observe that small firms’ ability to benefit
from R&D spillover makes them relatively more innovative, whereas Parker
(1978) points out that control and bureaucracy problems within large firms
hamper their R&D efficiency. Thus there appears to be no conclusive evidence
that large firms are more innovative than small firms.
The second question is whether firm size plays any role in a firm’s ability
to appropriate the results of R&D investment. Chan, Martin, and Kensinger
(1990) and Chauvin and Hirschey (1993) and find that the positive effect of
R&D investment on firm value is strongest for the largest firms. Levin et al.
(1987) argue that firms consider investment in complementary sales and ser-
vice efforts as highly effective means for the appropriation of product in-
novation. Since large firms are more likely to have control of and access to
these assets than small firms, they can be more effective in reaping the results
of their R&D investments. Therefore, although large firms may be less pro-
ductive in undertaking R&D at the margin, they are more effective in appro-
priating the results of the R&D output.4 Thus we hypothesize that the appro-
priability advantages of larger firms result in their superior ability to create
growth opportunities from their R&D investment compared to smaller firms.
B. Financial Leverage and R&D’s Impact on Growth Opportunities
The effect on debt financing of R&D investments has been the subject of
numerous studies (Szewczyk et al. 1996; Zantout 1997; Vincente-Lorente
2001; O’Brien 2003). The results are mixed, with some finding that debt has
a positive effect on R&D investment’s ability to create value for the firm and
others finding a negative effect or no effect at all. This is not surprising since
financial leverage influences managers’ investment behaviors in two contrast-
ing manners: positively, through playing a disciplinary role, and negatively,
through the presence of agency cost and information asymmetry problems.
These contrasting influences confound the effect of leverage. On one hand,
the disciplinary role of debt acts as a positive influence on managerial behavior
4. A more protracted line of argument for the advantages of large firms benefiting from R&D
includes internal funding capabilities, larger tax shields to cover expenses, brand recognition for
large companies (Kamien and Schwartz 1982), sales and marketing advantages (Levin et al.
1987), complementarities, and ready demand, among others.
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by reining in managerial discretion and driving managers to invest in projects
with positive net present value (NPV). Thus R&D projects undertaken under
a high debt ratio regime are expected to add positive value to the firm. This
expectation by investors is borne out by the event studies of Szewczyk et al.
(1996) and Zantout (1997), where significant positive relationships between
abnormal stock returns and announcements of planned increases in R&D
expenditures are observed only in firms with a relatively high debt ratio
(Zantout and Tsetsekos 1994).
On the other hand, agency cost and information asymmetry problems are
likely to negatively influence the ability of a high-leverage firm to appropriate
benefits from its R&D investments. Agency cost problems arise when the
interests of the debt holders (principal) and managers (agent) cannot be aligned
in an R&D investment situation. In such cases, underinvestment and asset
substitution detrimental to debt holders can occur more easily in R&D projects
than in other capital projects. Knowing the possibility of such behaviors, debt
holders would demand a premium that raises the cost of the debt, thus reducing
the value of the R&D investment. In addition, information asymmetry reduces
the attractiveness of R&D projects to outside investors (debt holders) when
managers withhold information to maintain confidentiality for competitive
reasons. These outside investors will overestimate the project risk when they
have little basis for predicting the outcomes of such projects. Hence, agency
cost and information asymmetry problems render debt financing of R&D
projects relatively more expensive and less preferred than other options. For
example, Bhagat and Welch (1995) observe a negative association between
the debt ratio of firms and R&D investment effect on the value of firms. In
another example, Kamien and Schwartz (1982) posit that investors will value
a firm’s R&D effects positively when they use their own funds for their R&D
efforts.5
In addition to the above two opposing theories on how financial leverage
influences managers’ investment behaviors, there is a significant branch of
literature on transaction cost economics that examines how the types of in-
vestment made by managers affect the capital structure of a firm.6 Williamson
(1988, 567) noted that the choice of project financing “depends principally
on the characteristics of the assets.” Titman and Wessels (1988, 17) put it in
another way, by postulating that “debt levels are negatively related to the
‘uniqueness’ of a firm’s line of business.” This is based on the tenet that
governance7 structures must be crafted to “economize on bounded rationality
while simultaneously safeguarding the transaction in question against the haz-
ards of opportunism” (Williamson 1988, 569). Investment in R&D poses one
5. Investors in firms undertaking R&D face two problems: difficulty in monitoring the man-
ager’s action in R&D and the information asymmetry problem, whereby the managers have more
information pertaining to the value of the project and variance of the returns than investors.
6. We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this new insight to our attention.
7. In the transaction cost economics literature, governance relates to the policing mechanism
of the contractual relationships between parties to a firm.
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such challenge because it results in firm-specific assets that “cannot be cost-
lessly deployed to other uses” (Balakrishnan and Fox 1993, 3). The end result
is that such firm-specific assets cannot be used effectively as collateral for
borrowings (O’Brien 2003). Hence, strategic management studies have con-
cluded that firms with higher degrees of firm-specific assets (such as invest-
ment in R&D) are found to have less debts since equity financing is optimal
for assets whose values can be appropriated only by such firms (Williamson
1988; Balakrishnan and Fox 1993; Vincente-Lorente 2001; O’Brien 2003).
Thus we hypothesize that although financial leverage and investment in
R&D are negatively related, leverage will play an ambiguous role in influ-
encing a firm’s ability to appropriate benefits of R&D investment in generating
growth opportunities as a result of the interaction between the positive effects
of its disciplinary role and the negative effects of agency cost and information
asymmetry problems. The final impact of financial leverage and investment
in R&D on growth opportunities may depend on firm size (Acs and Isberg
1996) or the industry structure the firm operates in.
C. Industry Concentration and R&D’s Impact on Growth Opportunities
In addition to the above endogenous factors affecting the value obtainable
from R&D investments, we consider a third salient exogenous factor: industry
concentration. Contrary to Schumpeter’s (1952) suggestion that market power
provides the condition for earning abnormal profits from innovation, a number
of studies find that high industry concentration, which would suggest high
market power, has, in fact, a negative moderating effect on the generation of
value by R&D investments (Grabowski and Mueller 1978; Connolly and
Hirschey 1984). There exist two plausible reasons for this counterintuitive
observation. First, increased intraindustry rivalry driven by the visibility of
competitors’ actions in high-concentration industries forces firms to adopt
similar levels of R&D investments irrespective of the expected returns, in
order to appear to be on the cutting edge and to “keep up with the Joneses”
(Grabowski and Mueller 1978; Connolly and Hirschey 1984).8 Second, new
product and process leakages (Mansfield 1985) are also greater in high-con-
centration industries, thus leading to the inability of firms to fully capture
value from their innovations.
However, Doukas and Switzer (1992) find that announcements of unex-
pected increases in R&D expenditure lead to positive abnormal stock returns
in the short term only if the announcing firm is in a high-concentration in-
dustry. They confirm the Schumpeterian postulation that firms in perfectly
competitive markets perform poorly in innovation compared to those operating
in more concentrated markets, and that investors appear to attribute market
concentration as a significant factor in a firm’s ability to benefit from its R&D
investment.
8. This is a form of herding behavior similar to the spirit of rational behavior proposed in
Scharfstein and Stein (1990).
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Thus there exists conflicting empirical evidence and economic rationale on
the direction of the moderating impact of high industry concentration on the
effectiveness of R&D investment in generating growth opportunities.
D. Interactions of Firm and Industry Characteristics on R&D Investment
The initial focus on the independent effect of each of the firm and industry
characteristics was broadened to include the interactions of these firm and
industry characteristics when it became obvious that such interactions do
occur. The effect of industry concentration may be especially salient (Mc-
Gahan 1999a, 1999b). The strategic interaction among the small number of
large firms in a high-concentration industry is likely to lead to competitive
matching since the actions of each firm are very visible. Competitive matching
may dilute the appropriability advantage large firms obtain from their R&D
investments when it leads to the funding of negative NPV projects. Compared
to large firms, smaller firms may face a double disadvantage in a high-con-
centration industry for two reasons. First, the greater relative difference in
size between large and small firms in such a high-concentration industry will
render the small firm’s appropriability advantage weaker than in a more com-
petitive market. Second, small firms face a potential resource drain in the
competitive matching race because of their limited size and access to funds.
In addition, industry concentration could also affect the moderating impact
of financial leverage. Under high industry concentration conditions, the dis-
ciplinary role of high financial leverage may not be perceived as strong enough
to prevent firms facing competitive matching pressure from funding negative
NPV R&D projects.
What about the interaction between size and leverage? Transaction cost
analysis can throw some light on the size-leverage interaction effect. Acs and
Isberg (1996) find that even though the intangible nature of innovation assets
arising from R&D investment is an important determinant of a firm’s capital
structure, the firm size effect on capital structure seems to dominate. Large
firms that invest in innovation resulting in firm-specific assets that are less
acceptable for collateral purposes use less debt. On the contrary, Acs and
Isberg (1996) find that small firms actually use more debts to finance their
innovations. There exist several explanations for this small-firm effect. First,
limited access to equity capital and binding liquidity constraints (Fazzari,
Hubbard, and Petersen 1988; Evans and Jovanovic 1989; Holtz-Eakin, Joul-
faian, and Rosen 1994) leave debt as the primary financing alternative for
small firms that desire to invest in positive NPV investment. Second, small
firms facing binding liquidity constraints most likely must source funds from
banks for their attractive R&D investments since such firms are unlikely to
have access to impersonal centralized debt markets (Fazzari et al. 1988). These
small firms can overcome the information asymmetry problems since they
can divulge proprietary project information to banks on a confidential basis
without the information spilling over to competitors. Third, the small size of
This content downloaded from 137.132.123.69 on Thu, 02 Jun 2016 08:36:08 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Growth Opportunities 859
the firms facilitates the lenders’ task of conducting due diligence and moni-
toring to ensure that the funds are indeed invested in NPV-enhancing in-
vestments. This supposes that small firms are more transparent to lenders than
large firms. A final explanation is that since a small firm’s R&D investment
requirements constitute only a small portion of the lender’s total loan portfolio,
the financial risk to the lender is relatively low. Acs and Isberg (1991) confirm
this fact when they observe that the low funding requirements of small firms
allow them to obtain funds from banks, resulting in more personalized banking
relationships between the firms and the banks.
Given the above endogenous firm and industry characteristics, we would
expect firms to converge to the optimal mix of firm and industry characteristics
so as to maximize their growth opportunities. Thus we formulate the following
two hypotheses from the above discussion. First, we hypothesize that large
firms operating in low-concentration industries with low financial leverage
will be in the best position to convert their R&D investment into growth
opportunities, since large firms have an appropriability advantage conferred
by size. Operating in low-concentration industries frees such firms from com-
petitive matching behavior in R&D investment, and low leverage leaves them
with sufficient financial slack to exploit investment opportunities. Second, we
hypothesize that small firms operating in low-concentration industries with
high financial leverage can maximize growth opportunities from R&D in-
vestments. Small firms operating in low-concentration industries without the
pressure of competitive matching will embark only on R&D with positive
NPV impact. These small firms exercise discipline in their investment choice
because binding liquidity constraints force them to borrow from banks, which
will advance loans only on projects with positive growth opportunities. Fur-
thermore, small firms will allow the funding banks access to project proprietary
information for evaluation and monitoring; thus the banks’ willingness to fund
these firms’ projects is a positive signal of the prospects of the firms.
The above discussion identifies a gap in the literature as to how the firm
and industry characteristics will collectively moderate the impact R&D in-
vestment has on the growth opportunities of firms. It is important to bridge
this gap because the investment decisions of managers, investors, and creditors
are affected by their evaluation of how effective firms are in the creation of
growth opportunities from R&D investments under differing firm conditions
and industry characteristics.
III. Research Design and Description of the Sample
In this section, we present the research design and the data used for the study.
Accounting data, covering the period 1979–98,9 are obtained from COM-
9. Ideally, we would have preferred to cover the period from 1975 onward when the Statement
of Financial Accounting Standards no. 2 became effective (Financial Accounting Standards Board
1974). But we were unable to obtain earlier data, from 1975 to 1978, since we do not subscribe
to the COMPUSTAT back data.
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PUSTAT annual data tapes for both active (CS Active) and research (CS
Research) U.S. companies to reduce the possible effects of survivorship bias,
and share price data are taken from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP). Only firms with a December 31 fiscal year end are included in order
to have a consistent cutoff date and thus higher certainty as to when the
financial information of the sample firms were publicly available. This allows
us to use the stock price measure at a consistent point in time for all firms
in any particular year.10 The accounting data of year t are matched with stock
prices at the end of April of year to ensure that the annual financialt  1
statements of firms for fiscal year t are already available to the public. This
method was suggested by Banz and Breen (1986) and Fama and French (1992)
to avoid the look-ahead bias.
Our study employs five variables: firm size, financial leverage, industry
concentration, growth opportunities, and R&D investment. Firm size is mea-
sured by the natural logarithm of a firm’s net sales. The proxy for financial
leverage is the ratio of book value of long-term debt to book value of total
assets at the end of the year. The long-term debt is used because R&D is a
long-term investment that is normally financed using long-term financing.
Industry concentration is proxied by the percentage of total net sales in a
particular industry attributable to the four largest firms (ranked in terms of
sales).11
Next, growth opportunities are proxied by the ratio market-to-book value
of assets (MBASS).12 Kallapur and Trombley (1999) find that market-to-book
ratios such as market-to-book value of assets, market-to-book value of equity,
Tobin’s q, and the ratio of market value of assets to book value of property,
plant, and equipment are most highly correlated with the realized growth of
a firm.13 MBASS is used since it is easy to compute and does not sacrifice
accuracy and purpose.
Finally, the amount of capitalized R&D expenditure divided by the firm’s
book value of total assets at the end of the year is used as the measure of
R&D investment in our study. Capitalized R&D investment is used instead
of annual R&D expenditure to account for the fact that this investment gen-
10. We are appreciative of the limitation that the omission of non–December 31 fiscal year
companies can bias our sample against young technology firms listed on the NASDAQ. None-
theless, there are a total of 22 industries in our sample according to the two-digit Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC).
11. This measure of industry concentration (CR4) is a popular measure in the literature (Con-
nolly and Hirschey 1984; Doukas and Switzer 1992). To be consistent with previous studies for
comparison purposes, we have not used the Herfindahl index as a proxy for industry concentration.
12. We have also used the market-to-book value of equity ratio (MBEQU) as the alternative
growth opportunities measure, and the results are qualitatively similar.
13. The use of MBASS, MBEQU, and Tobin’s q to proxy growth opportunities or firms’ future
performance has been rigorously applied in many earlier studies (see, e.g., Smith and Watts
1992; Lang et al. 1996; Bharadwaj, Bharadwaj, and Konsynski 1999). The choice of accounting
method does affect book value of the assets or equity, which in turn affects the MBASS and
MBEQU measures. The simplicity of using MBASS and MBEQU as a measure of growth
opportunities outweighs the benefits of constructing more complex measures of growth
opportunities.
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erates both current and future benefits for the investing firm (Hirschey and
Weygandt 1985; Lev and Sougiannis 1996). The erosion of this capital over
time due to obsolescence and knowledge leakages to other firms in the industry
demands that the capitalized R&D investment be amortized over the duration
of the R&D benefits (Griliches 1979). The capitalized R&D investment is
computed using the straight line amortization method that is adjusted for
inflation as follows:
K1 2m  1 CPI tRDI p RDE 1  , (3)i,t i,tm ( ) ( )2K CPImp 0 tm
where RDIi,t is the capitalized R&D investment of firm i at the end of year
t; RDEi,t is the R&D expenditure of firm i for year t; K is the estimated
duration of the economic life of the R&D; and CPIt is the average of the
consumer price index value in year t. This is consistent with the approach
employed by Hirschey and Weygandt (1985) and Grabowski and Mueller
(1978). Hirschey and Weygandt suggest that the duration of the economic life
of R&D investments is between five and 10 years; Lev and Sougiannis (1996)
find that the duration ranges from five to nine years, depending on the industry
examined. Since the durations of R&D economic life for all industries are
uncertain and nonuniform, we follow previous studies and use five, seven,
and nine years so as to minimize the potential problem of inaccuracy in R&D
duration estimation, as well as to check for the robustness of the results.14 In
addition, since there are uncertainties about the timing of R&D expenditure,
this formula assumes that, on average, R&D expenditure is incurred in the
middle of the fiscal year.
All variables in our study, with the exception of industry concentration,
are adjusted to control for possible industry-specific effects. We define an
industry as containing all firms with the same two-digit primary SIC.15 Dif-
ferences across industries that might affect the firm-specific variables of in-
terest include the stage of the industry life cycle and its corresponding industry
growth rate, the level of systematic risk, the nature of R&D activities pursued
(e.g., basic research vs. applied research), the expected R&D expenditure, and
the reasonable level of financial leverage. We control for industry effects by
14. There is a limitation in our study since the R&D for industries such as chemicals and
pharmaceuticals may be longer than nine years. In addition, protection for patents and copyrights
is normally longer than nine years. However, catering to a time frame of greater than nine years
will significantly reduce the sample size, and using different time frames for different industries
(Lev and Sougiannis 1996) may introduce a higher degree of subjectivity in the study.
15. The use of the two-digit SIC to define an industry is a crude method because companies
within a two-digit SIC industry differ significantly in terms of their use of R&D. However, we
argue that any finer classification of the companies into different industries, such as using a four-
digit SIC, will make the sample size for each industry too small to obtain reliable statistical
estimates.
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MBASS p {[N # SP ]  (TOTASS  BVEQU )}  TOTASSi,t i,t i,(t1),4 i,t i,t i,t
R&D investment
(RDi,t)
RDIi,t/TOTASSi,t p K1(S RDE {1  [(2m  1)/2K]}(CPI /CPI ))mp 0 i,tm t tm
 TOTASSi,t
DumSIZE Dummy variable will be 1 if the size of the firm is greater than the me-
dian of the industry
DumCONC Dummy variable will be 1 if the firm belongs to a high concentration
industry; the median value of all firms in an industry is used as the
benchmark.
DumLev Dummy variable will be 1 if the financial leverage of the firm is greater
than the median of the industry
YrDum Dummy variable for the respective years
Not e.—The definition of the variables used in this study are as follows (numbers in parentheses signify
the COMPUSTAT data number). LNSALEi,t is the natural logarithm of the net sales of firm i for the period
ending December of year t (#12); BFSALEt is the sum of net sales of the biggest four firms (in terms of net
sales) in the industry to which firm i belongs for the period ending December of year t; TOTSALEINDt is
the total net sales of all firms in the same two-digit SIC industry to which firm i belongs for the period ending
December of year t; CONCt is the ratio of the total net sales of the biggest four firms over the total net sales
of the industry for year t; LTDEBTi,t is the book value of total long-term debt of firm i at December of year
t (#9); TOTASSi,t is the book value of total assets of firm i at December of year t (#6); LEVi,t is the ratio of
total long-term debts to total assets of firm i at December of year t; BVEQUi,t is the book value of equity of
firm i at December of year t (#60); Ni,t is the number of outstanding shares of firm i at December of year t
(#25); SPi,(t1).4 is the closing stock price of firm i at the end of April of year ; MBASSi,t is the market-t 1
to-book value of assets of firm i at December of year t, defined as the sum of market value of equity and
book value of debt, divided by book value of total assets (market value of equity is computed as the number
of outstanding shares multiplied by stock price; book value of debt is calculated as the book value of total
assets minus the book value of equity); RDIi,t is the capitalized R&D investment of firm i at December of
year t; RDEi,t is the R&D expenditure of firm i for the period ending December of year t (#46); CPIt is the
average consumer price index value in the year t; K is the estimated average of R&D duration (the estimated
average useful life of R&D), namely, the number of years of capitalization of R&D (K p 5, 7, 9 years).
using the normalization-by-industry-median method.16 All firm-specific var-
iables (i.e., growth opportunities, investment in R&D, firm size, and financial
leverage) are adjusted by normalizing each firm-year observation by the in-
dustry median (i.e., the median for all sample firms with the same two-digit
primary SIC code) for the same sample year. Hence a firm’s attributes are
defined in relation to the industry to which it belongs.
Table 1 presents the formula for the computation of the variables used in
our study.
We now discuss the data used in our study. To be included in the sample,
firms must have a positive value for total common equity and available data
16. Healy and Palepu (1988) is the first study to use the difference between a firm and industry
method rather than industry dummy variables to control for industry effects. We want to remove
any possible scale effect and have thus used a normalization method instead. We recognize that
a concern in the use of a normalization by industry median method is the introduction of
nonlinearity into the relationships between the dependent and independent variables.
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for net sales, total assets, long-term debt, number of common shares outstand-
ing, and closing stock price on April of the following year, , as well ast  1
R&D expenditure for years to t, where , 7, and 9.17t  (K  1) K p 5
Given the above requirements, our initial data sets with R&D duration of
five, seven, and nine years have 7,640, 5,765, and 4,353 firm-year observa-
tions, respectively. Specifically, these initial data of R&D durations of five,
seven, and nine years consist of 20 years of data (1979–98) of which the first
five, seven, and nine years are used to construct the value of R&D investment
for the year the amortization period first ends (namely, leaving 15, 13, and
11 years of data for testing purposes), respectively.
Further, to prevent problems of outliers, all data points that have extreme
values on any of the variables, whether dependent or explanatory, are removed
from these preliminary data sets.18 The final sample consists of 6,227, 4,721,
and 3,550 firm-year observations with R&D durations of five, seven, and nine
years, respectively. This represents an average of 415, 363, and 322 firms per
year for these three R&D durations. The final sample covers a total of 1,048
firms over a 15-year period. The requirement of at least five years of R&D
data for the computation of capitalized R&D biased the sample toward larger
manufacturing firms.
We also use three alternative values for R&D duration results in three sets
of data, each with a different number of observations because of the screening
procedure. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and the total number of
observations for the three sets of firm-specific data used in our study.
Two major observations from the descriptive statistics of the firm-specific
data in table 2 are noted. First, the mean of the firm size as measured by net
sales is eight to 10 times the median, indicating that the sample is obviously
skewed toward larger firms. Second, the descriptive statistics suggest that the
use of different durations for the economic life of R&D investments does not
result in significantly different values for the sample except for firm size, in
which longer R&D durations correspond to larger values for the mean and
median of firm size.19 The Pearson correlations among the industry-adjusted
explanatory variables are presented in table 3.
From table 3, it can be seen that several of the explanatory variables are
highly correlated (boldface entries in table 3), especially those that involve
interactions. The multicollinearity present in our regression is not a problem
17. In order to allow for the adjustment of industry effects, the sample includes only firms in
a two-digit primary SIC industry in which there are at least five firms available after passing
the prior screening of data availability.
18. An extreme value is defined as any value below the first quartile less 1.5 times the inter-
quartile range or any value greater than the third quartile plus 1.5 times the interquartile range.
The outliers are mainly data with extremely high values, and most of the outliers were from
MBASS, RDA, and LEV (about 90% of the outliers). For interaction studies, outliers can affect
the stability of the estimated coefficient because of significant multicollinearity problems (Greene
1993).
19. This provides some evidence that the lengthening of the R&D duration will introduce
survivorship bias to the sample.
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TABLE 2 Descriptive Statistics of the Samples for the Period 1980–98
R&D Duration
5 Years 7 Years 9 Years
MBASS:
Mean 1.631 1.622 1.634
Median 1.408 1.417 1.431
Standard deviation .009 .010 .012
Minimum .359 .359 .359
Maximum 6.437 6.887 5.445
RDI:
Mean .102 .130 .160
Median .069 .090 .114
Standard deviation .001 .002 .002
Minimum .001 .002 .003
Maximum .772 .847 1.020
Net sales (US$ millions):
Mean 4,450.418 5,058.693 5,615.281
Median 424.685 528.743 653.658
Standard deviation 163.349 206.129 256.215
Minimum .675 .841 .598
Maximum 168,190 168,190 168,190
LEV:
Mean .158 .162 .161
Median .142 .147 .148
Standard deviation .001 .002 .002
Minimum .000 .000 .000
Maximum .734 .648 .648
CONC:
Mean .352 .352 .348
Median .356 .356 .356
Standard deviation .084 .083 .081
Minimum .171 .171 .171
Maximum .616 .607 .602
Observations 6,227 4,721 3,550
Not e.—This table presents the descriptive statistics of the following variables used in this study: market-
to-book-value-of-assets (MBASS), capitalized R&D investment (RDI), firm sales (NET SALES), firm leverage
(LEV), and industry concentration (CONC) measures. Descriptions for all variables can be found in table 1.
since we are interested in the incremental effects of the explanatory variables
after controlling for the main effects (namely, firm size, financial leverage,
and industry concentration).20 Since the presence of multicollinearity will set
up a bias toward insignificant results, any significant results will provide strong
support for our hypotheses.
IV. Analysis of Results: Independent Effects of Firm Size, Financial
Leverage, Industry Concentration, and R&D Investment
Table 4 reports the results of the multivariate regression models for the in-
dependent effects of industry-adjusted firm size, industry-adjusted financial
20. In almost all regression studies on interaction effects, multicollinearity is always a problem
that biases the results against finding a significant coefficient. We decide to accept this limitation
rather than use a biased regression estimator such as the Ridge regression estimator proposed
by Greene (1993) to correct for the problem of multicollinearity.
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TABLE 3 Pearson Correlation Coefficients
RD RD# LNSIZE RD# CONC RD# LEV LNSIZE CONC LEV
RD 1.000  .132 .925 .554  .101 .038  .179
RD# LNSIZE 1.000  .083  .068 .834 .032 .036
RD# CONC 1.000 .520  .081 .348  .159
RD# LEV 1.000  .031† .037 .555
LNSIZE 1.000  .036 .098
CONC 1.000  .007†
LEV 1.000
Not e.—This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for the data set with the R&D duration of
five years, and R&D investment (RD), firm sales (LNSALES), industry concentration (CONC), and firm
leverage (LEV) measures. # ’ signifies the interactions between two variables. The statistics are qualitatively
similar for seven-year and nine-year durations of R&D investment. All variables are normalized by the industry
median except for CONC. Descriptions for all variables can be found in table 1. All coefficient values are
significant with 5% significance except those noted.
† Insignificant.
leverage, and industry concentration on the effectiveness of R&D investment
in generating growth opportunities. Year dummy variables are included in all
regression models to control for possible influences related to economywide
conditions. A pooled ordinary least squares regression using the Newey-West
(1987) method to correct for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of un-
known form is employed. The coefficient values for the year dummies are
not presented in the table since they are generally insignificant.
Table 4 shows that the results are very consistent across different R&D
durations (except for RD2, which is significant only for R&D duration of five
years, and RD# LNSIZE, which is not significant for the R&D duration of
five years).
An analysis of the coefficients of the control variables in table 4 shows
that firm size and industry concentration are significantly positive whereas
financial leverage is significantly negative.
The positive coefficient of firm size is not consistent with that of Evans
(1987a, 1987b), who observes that smaller firms tend to grow faster than
larger firms. However, our results support the findings of positive firm size
effects of Levin et al. (1987), Hall (1993), and Chauvin and Hirschey (1993).
The negative relationship between financial leverage and a firm’s growth
opportunities is consistent with the behavior of high-growth firms as theorized
by Myers and Majluf (1984). High-growth firms with valuable investment
opportunities prefer a position of low leverage to maintain a reserve borrowing
capacity (financial slack) for exploiting future positive NPV investment op-
portunities (Myers and Majluf 1984; Harris and Raviv 1990; Lang et al. 1996).
The lack of financial slack causes underinvestment problems since firms would
sometimes forgo profitable future investments.
The positive coefficient for concentration implies that higher industry con-
centration leads to more growth opportunities for firms. This is consistent
with the results of Doukas and Switzer (1992), who explain that firms in more
concentrated industries are in a better position to translate their market power
into growth opportunities.
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TABLE 4 Results for the Independent Effects
R&D Duration























































Annual dummy variables yes† yes† yes†
Adjusted 2R .053 .056 .067
F-statistics 16.877*** 15.066*** 15.229***
Observations 6,227 4,721 3,550
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.868 1.877 1.892
Not e.—This table presents the results for the independent effects of firm size (LNSIZE), financial leverage
(LEV), and industry concentration (CONC) on the effectiveness of R&D investment (RD) in generating growth
opportunities (MBASS). The t-values are in parentheses. Descriptions for all the variables can be found in
table 1. MBASS is defined as
2a  a RD  a RD  a (RD# LNSIZE) a (RD# LEV)  a (RD# CONC)0 1 2 3 4 5
T1
 a LNSIZE a LEV  a CONC  a YrDum   .6 7 8 8 t t 1
tp 1
** 5% level of significance.
*** 1% level of significance.
† Year dummy variables are used; they are generally insignificant.
Table 4 also shows that R&D investment retains a significant positive impact
on a firm’s growth opportunities even after one controls for the effects of firm
size, financial leverage, and industry concentration. This shows that the impact
of R&D investment on a firm’s growth opportunities is robust. In addition,
the coefficients of the square term of R&D investment are negative, providing
some evidence of a nonlinear relationship between R&D investment and
growth opportunities (although this negative relationship is significant only
for R&D duration of five years).
Examination of the interactions between R&D and firm size (RD# LNSIZE)
in table 4 shows a significant positive relationship with growth opportunity,
except for an R&D duration of five years. This positive relationship is con-
sistent with Chauvin and Hirschey’s (1993) view that larger firms are more
effective in generating growth opportunities from their R&D investments be-
cause of the appropriability advantage conferred by their size. Furthermore,
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Cohen and Klepper (1996) observe that larger businesses can spread their
R&D expenses over bigger volumes, conferring size advantages in the un-
dertaking of R&D. Hence, the result is in line with investors’ expectations
that firm size exerts a significant influence on a firm’s ability to appropriate
value from R&D investment.
Table 4 shows a statistically insignificant coefficient for the interaction
between R&D investment and financial leverage (RD# LEV). The lack of a
clear indication of the leverage effect is not totally unexpected given the
existence of two opposing effects of high financial leverage: the positive debt
monitoring effect on the one hand and the negative effects from agency and
information asymmetry problems on the other hand. In addition, transaction
cost economics suggests that firms with high levels of R&D investment require
discretionary power to act. This requirement decreases the likelihood of the
use of debts with their incongruent rigid governance structure. This avoidance
of debt is demonstrated in our study by the negative correlation between R&D
investment and financial leverage shown earlier in table 3. Thus debt alone
may not be a discriminating factor in influencing investor expectations about
the ability of firms to appropriate value from their R&D investments.
Finally, the significant negative coefficients for the interaction between
R&D investment and industry concentration (RD# CONC) in table 4 suggest
that while higher industry concentration and higher R&D investment are in-
dividually associated with greater growth opportunities, R&D undertaken in
a high industry concentration environment is marginally less effective in gen-
erating growth opportunities than that undertaken in a low industry concen-
tration environment. This result is consistent with the findings of Grabowski
and Mueller (1978) and Connolly and Hirschey (1984) of a negative asso-
ciation between the R&D-concentration interaction and a firm’s financial per-
formance. Our finding supports the argument that marginal returns for R&D
investment in high-concentration industries diminish more rapidly because of
competitive matching prevalent in a high-concentration market (Grabowski
and Mueller 1978; Mansfield 1985). Hence, investors would discount the value
of a firm’s R&D investments in the high-concentration industry since they
have little confidence in the firms’ ability to extract value from their R&D
investments.
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V. Analysis of Results: Two-Way Interaction Effects of Firm Size,
Financial Leverage, and Industry Concentration with R&D
Investment
We use the following three regression models to test for interaction effects.
Model 1 (refer to table 1 for a description of the variables):
2GO p g  g RD  g RD  g (RD # LNSIZE)0 1 2 3
 g (RD # LNSIZE # DumLEV)4
 g (RD # LNSIZE # DumCONC)5
 g (RD # LEV)  g (RD # CONC)  g LNSIZE6 7 8
T1
 g LEV  g CONC  g YrDum   . (4)9 10 10t t 1
tp 1
Model 1 tests the effect of firm size under each of the following conditions:
high financial leverage firms (RD# LNSIZE# DumLEV) and high industry
concentration (RD# LNSIZE# DumCONC). Given our above hypotheses on
the interaction effects, we expect and .g ! 0 g ! 04 5
Model 2 (refer to table 1 for a description of the variables):
2GO p p  p RD  p RD  p (RD # LNSIZE)0 1 2 3
 p (RD # LEV)  p (RD # CONC)4 5
 p (RD # LEV # DumSIZE)6
 p (RD # LEV # DumCONC)  p LNSIZE7 8
T1
 p LEV  p CONC  p YrDum   . (5)9 10 10 t t 3
tp 1
Model 2 examines the financial leverage effect under the following conditions:
large firm size (RD# LEV# DumSIZE) and high industry concentration
(RD# LEV# DumCONC).21 We expect and , given ourp ! 0 p ! 06 7
hypotheses.
21. We have not reported the results of the model on the industry concentration effects under
different firm size and financial leverage since industry concentration is an exogenous condition
that a firm has limited ability to influence. Nonetheless, the results are available from the authors
on request.
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Model 3 (refer to table 1 for a description of the variables):
2GO p l  l RD  l RD  l (RD # LNSIZE)0 1 2 3
 l (RD # LNSIZE # DumLEV)4
 l (RD # LNSIZE # DumCONC)  l (RD # LEV)5 6
 l (RD # CONC)  l (RD # LEV # DumSIZE)7 8
 l (RD # LEV # DumCONC)  l LNSIZE  l LEV9 10 11
T1
 l CONC  l YrDum   . (6)12 12t t 4
tp 1
Finally, model 3 tests the combined interaction effects of the above three
variables. On the basis of our hypotheses, we expect , , ,l ! 0 l ! 0 l ! 04 5 8
and .l ! 09
Table 5 presents the regression results using MBASS as the measure of a
firm’s growth opportunities.22
From table 5, it can be seen that the individual effects of firm size, financial
leverage, and industry concentration are significant and consistent with the
findings in table 4 for all three R&D durations and the three different models.
Similarly, their respective interaction effects with R&D investment are again
consistent with the findings in table 4.
With respect to the interactions between firm size and the other two vari-
ables, the results in models 1 and 3 show that the coefficients of RD#
LNSIZE# DumLEV are negative and significant across all three R&D du-
rations.23 The advantage large firms possess in creating growth opportunities
from R&D investments when financial leverage is low disappears under high
financial leverage situations. This result can be explained by a number of
factors. Large firms with high leverage lack the financial slack to invest in
emerging R&D opportunities. In addition, the market expecting large firms
to internally fund attractive R&D projects to capture value from such in-
vestments will perceive the presence of high leverage to be a signal that their
R&D investments have poor prospects. Finally, an application of transaction
cost analysis would suggest that the use of debt gives rise to a rigid rule-
based governance structure when a more flexible administrative-based struc-
ture is required to exploit R&D opportunities in a dynamic situation (Wil-
liamson 1988; Acs and Isberg 1996). Thus inappropriate governance structure
will cause such firms to enjoy lower growth opportunities.
22. As per table 4, year dummy variables are used.
23. For example, in model 3 of table 5, when R&D duration is seven years, the coefficient
values of RD# LNSIZE and RD# LNSIZE# DumLEV are 0.021 and 0.026, respectively. This
means that the coefficient value of RD# LNSIZE for low-leverage firms (DumLEV p 0) is
0.021, whereas the coefficient value of RD# LNSIZE for high-leverage firms (DumLEV p 1)
is 0.005 (p ).0.021  0.026
This content downloaded from 137.132.123.69 on Thu, 02 Jun 2016 08:36:08 UTC





TABLE 5 Results for the Two-Way Interactions Effects
R&D Duration 5 Years R&D Duration 7 Years R&D Duration 9 Years
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Adjusted 2R .059† .054† .059† .069† .058† .065† .076† .069† .075†
Observations 6,227 6,227 6,227 4,721 4,721 4,721 3,550 3,550 3,550
Not e.—This table presents the results from regressions on the two-way interactions between firm size (LNSIZE), financial leverage (LEV), and industry concentration (CONC) on the
effectiveness of R&D investment (RD) in generating growth opportunities (MBASS) using combined-continuous-dummy-variable regression models. The t-values are in parentheses. Descriptions
of all the variables can be found in table 1. The three models are defined in eqq. (4), (5), and (6).
** 5% level of significance.
*** 1% level of significance.
† F-statistics significant at the 1% level.
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We also find that the coefficients of RD# LNSIZE# DumCONC in models
1 and 3 are negative but insignificant across the three R&D durations. These
findings suggest that the positive impact of firm size in increasing effectiveness
of R&D investment in generating growth opportunities is not significantly
different across low- and high-concentration industries. Hence, the proposition
that the positive impact of firm size will be reduced in a high-concentration
industry is not supported.
Next, we examine the financial leverage effect on a firm’s growth oppor-
tunities from its R&D investment under different firm size and industry con-
centration scenarios (RD# LEV# DumSIZE and RD# LEV# DumCONC).
The coefficients of RD# LEV# DumSIZE are not consistent between models
2 and 3, and RD# LEV# DumCONC coefficients are negative but insignif-
icant across the three R&D durations as shown in models 2 and 3 in table 5.
Interestingly, the coefficients of RD# LEV# DumSIZE are significant only
for R&D durations of seven and nine years in model 2; that is, there are
indications that while the level of financial leverage does not affect the ef-
fectiveness of smaller firms in appropriating growth opportunities from R&D
investment (the coefficient of RD# LEV in models 2 and 3 of table 5 is
insignificant), increasing leverage does negatively affect the larger firm’s ef-
fectiveness for these two R&D durations. This is consistent with the earlier
finding that large firms with high financial leverage have their appropriability
advantage diluted. What is interesting to note here is that no negative impact
is observed on the appropriability of R&D investments for small firms in-
creasing their level of financial leverage, in contrast to the larger firms dis-
cussed above. The reason may be that smaller firms suffer from binding
liquidity constraints and limited funding sources, and will hence go into debt
only to finance positive NPV projects (Fazzari et al. 1988; Evans and Jova-
novic 1989; Holtz-Eakin et al. 1994; Acs and Isberg 1996). A high leverage
level may thus not be perceived as a negative signal, in contrast to the large
firms.
In summary, table 5 yields two interesting observations that offer additional
evidence on the importance of the two-way interaction effects between firm
size, financial leverage, and industry concentration on the effectiveness of
R&D investment in generating growth opportunities that is consistent with
our hypotheses. First, the impact of firm size on R&D investment effectiveness
in inducing growth opportunities varies between firms with high and low
financial leverage. In our study, the positive effect of firm size on the effec-
tiveness of R&D investment in inducing growth opportunities, which indicates
the appropriability advantage of large firm size, is less pronounced or even
reversed for high financial leverage firms. This finding is economically in-
tuitive since large firms will reap maximum growth opportunities from R&D
investment through the appropriability advantage on the condition that they
have sufficient financial slack to finance the asset yet to be in place necessary
to commercialize their R&D investments. This result is also consistent with
the transaction cost analysis view that the types of assets or investments (in
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this case firm-specific R&D investments) would favor an equity-type funding
that results in a governance structure best suited to the maximization of the
growth opportunities of a firm through the provision for discretionary man-
agement action in the face of uncertain conditions (Williamson 1988; Bala-
krishnan and Fox 1993; Acs and Isberg 1996; Vincente-Lorente 2001; O’Brien
2003). Second, the results provide some evidence that the effect of financial
leverage on R&D investment effectiveness in inducing growth opportunities
appears to vary between large and small firms. The negative effect of financial
leverage seems to be present only in large firms. Small firms appear to be
superior to large firms in deriving growth opportunities from their R&D in-
vestments in a high financial leverage environment. This finding is consistent
with the economic intuition that small firms will be willing to embark on
R&D investment using high financial leverage only if they are productive in
using the investment in R&D to generate growth opportunities. In addition,
it appears that information asymmetry is not as much a problem for small
firms as it is for large firms because of differing sources of funding. The
private nature of this funding source allows small firms to disclose more details
about their innovation. Furthermore, according to the debt-monitoring hy-
pothesis, high financial leverage may signal that the small firm is undertaking
economically more viable projects compared to small firms with lower fi-
nancial leverage (Zantout 1997). Finally, this result suggests that small firms
that face binding liquidity constraints have limited options to grow except by
borrowing, and such borrowing is well received by banks and investors in
general (Fazzari et al. 1988; Evans and Jovanovic 1989; Holtz-Eakin et al.
1994).
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate how the interaction effects of two endogenous
variables, firm size and financial leverage, together with one exogenous var-
iable, industry concentration, moderate the impact of R&D investment on the
growth opportunities of a firm. When only the independent effects of firm
size, financial leverage, and industry concentration on the effectiveness of
R&D investment in generating growth opportunities are considered, we doc-
ument a significant positive effect for firm size and a significant negative
effect for industry concentration, whereas we find nonsignificant ambiguous
results for the independent effect of financial leverage.
Contrary to expected economic rationale about market power arising from
large firm size and the importance of financial slack in funding positive NPV
projects, our results show the complexity of the firm size–financial leverage
interaction. Investors attribute a higher growth opportunity arising from the
R&D capital of large firms compared to small firms only when the large firms
have low financial leverage. When high financial leverage is present, investors
instead expect smaller firms to be able to appropriate value from their R&D
capital better than larger firms. Our findings are consistent with the extant
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literature that the impact of R&D investment in the presence of a firm’s two
endogenous characteristics on growth opportunities is not straightforward.
Hence, we find qualified support for the comparative advantage in reaping
growth opportunities from R&D investment by large firms compared to that
by small firms. Clearly, the appropriability advantage of large firms is not a
universal phenomenon.
Surprisingly too, industry concentration does not play any significant role
as a moderating variable in determining the impact of R&D investment on
growth opportunity when its interactions with size and financial leverage are
examined. The reason is that the positive impact of market power arising
from firm size may be offset by the negative effect of the propensity to fund
negative NPV projects in a high-concentration market. Hence, investors are
not able to discern the high potential projects from duds, leading to their
inability to evaluate the value of R&D projects of large firms in high-con-
centration industries.
To conclude, our study provides new insights into the interaction effects
that firm size, financial leverage, and industry concentration have on the
effectiveness of R&D investment in generating growth opportunities. It will
be interesting and useful to extend this research to test how the relationship
between firm size, financial leverage, industry concentration, and the effec-
tiveness of R&D investment in generating growth opportunities will eventually
influence the growth of stock prices and thus shareholders’ wealth in an ex
post setting.
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